We stablish a general relationship between the standard form of the individualistic social-welfare function and the "reduced-form" version that is expressed in terms of inequality and mean income. This shows the relationship between the property of monotonicity and the slope of the equity-efficient trade-off. Particularly simple results are available for a large class of inequality measures that includes the Gini. These results do not require differentiability of the social-welfare function.
Introduction
Inequality indices embody explicitly or implicitly social values on income distribution. So it is common for those who are concerned with comparing distributional changes over time or between economies to draw conclusions from comparisons of estimates of average income and inequality. However the relationship between intuitive comparisons in terms of say, mean income and the Gini coe±cient, and formal principles of social welfare is not always made clear. The present paper focuses upon this relationship by characterising the shape of the equity-e±ciency trade-o®.. This trade-o® is at the heart of much theoretical and applied research. For example, it is become standard practice to use the obvious two-way relationship between certain classes of inequality indices and their associated social-welfare functions to infer propositions about distributional rankings and the ethical meaning of inequality measures.
1 In addition there is an interest in constructing socialwelfare functions for inequality measures with principally pragmatic appeal: for example, there have been a number of attempts to formalise a social-welfare function on the basis that the Gini coe±cient is the appropriate index of inequality.
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The precise method of doing this formalisation does not concern us here, except as illustrations of our approach. We want to examine in a general way what may be said in terms of standard welfare criteria if we use well-known practical indices as basic tools of distributional analysis.
The Approach
First, some notation and de¯nitions.
De¯nition 1 The set of income distributions X is the set of all ordered¯nite-dimensioned non-negative vectors, excluding the zero vector.
In implementing this de¯nition we adopt the convention that for any x 2 X:
:. Also, for any x 2 X, denote the number of persons in the distribution as n(x) and the arithmetic mean of the distribution as ¹(x).
Social welfare and inequality are given, respectively, by functions W : X ! <, I : X ! <. Economic meaning is given to W and I by a number of assumptions about their mathematical properties, many of which have come to be accepted as standard. Foremost among these are
De¯nition 2
The social welfare function is monotonic if, for any x; x 0 2 X,
De¯nition 3 The social welfare function (resp. an inequality measure) satis¯es the principle of transfers if, for any x; x 0 2 X and ± > 0 such that
The property of monotonicity is of particular interest in view of its relationship to the Pareto principle -see Amiel and Cowell (1994b) -although it does not enjoy universal support as a welfare principle -see Amiel and Cowell (1994a) , McClelland and Rohrbaugh (1978) .
De¯nition 4
The class W 1 of social welfare functions consists of functions W :
X ! < that satisfy the principles of monotonicity and transfers. If, for some
We shall establish results for a fairly broad class of inequality indices. To introduce this we need the following two de¯nitions:
De¯nition 5 For any x 2 X, the income share of person i is:
De¯nition 6 An additive distributional-shares inequality index can be written Examples of the ADSI class of indices include all the generalised-entropy indices, the Gini index, the relative mean deviation and the logarithmic variance.
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The results which follow will also apply to monotonic a±ne transforms of (2).
The Reduced-form SWF
It is common to¯nd the social welfare function written in a \reduced form" -as a function of mean income and inequality. 6 To formalise this approach let us introduce the concept of a distributional pro¯le z := (¹; I), a mean-income and inequality pair. In this interpretation the admissible set of pro¯les Z µ < 2 + may be written
where ¹ I is the least upper bound on I. Then the reduced-form SWF H (W ) : Z ! < is given by
where H (W ) is non-decreasing in its¯rst argument and non-increasing in its second argument.
Where there is no problem of ambiguity we will drop the superscript on H.
Notice that the adoption of this approach implies that two distributions with same z-pro¯le will be regarded as equivalent in welfare terms, and that the tradeo® implicit in the use of H is only well-de¯ned for a particular cardinalisation of the inequality index I. We shall assume that the issue of the appropriate cardinalisation has been settled by criteria which are not of concern to the present study.
Di®erentiable Social-welfare Functions
The ADSI class of measures contains a number of well known indices and yields some readily interpretable results. To see this let us endow I with the elementary cardinalisation of (2). Substituting from (2) into (4) we have
Assume further that W is di®erentiable. Then di®erentiating (5) with respect to
where the relevant partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts. From (6) the following result is immediate Theorem 1 Given a di®erentiable reduced form social-welfare function H the underlying individualistic welfare function satis¯es monotonicity if and only if the following condition on the slope of the welfare-contour is satis¯ed:
Applications
The condition (7) can be easily interpreted in the case of the Generalised Entropy index:
and the relative mean deviation:
where m(x) = #fx i · ¹(x)g. The interpretation of these results will be discussed below.
The Gini Index
The Gini index G(x) can also be obtained as a special case of (7) by rewriting.
it as:
where
We will call the extended Gini subclass those inequality measures of the form (10) but with the restriction (11) replaced by the mild condition that w i be increasing 7 See, for example Cowell (1995) , Sen (1973) .
with i. 8 Notice that for the extended Gini and the true Gini Á s = 1 wherever the di®erential is de¯ned. Also note that for the true Gini max
which for large populations becomes 1; in this limiting case the right-hand side of (7) becomes:
However in the case of the Gini index the di®erentiability assumption used in Theorem 1 will be inappropriate. For this reason and for the reason thatapart from mathematical tractability -di®erentiability has little to recommend it in social-welfare analysis, we seek a more general characterisation of the main point.
A General Result
To avoid the over-simpli¯cation associated with the di®erentiability assumption consider the general shape properties of the reduced-form social-welfare function at any arbitrary point in the set of all pro¯les Z.
For any distributional pro¯le z 0 2 Z it is clear that any point in
will be regarded as W 1 -preferable to z 0 . However, we can be more precise about the set of W 1 -preferable pro¯les. First de¯ne the set of income distributions consistent with any pro¯le z 0 2 Z:
and a conditional upper-bound value of inequality, of a given population size n = n(x):
where ¶ n := (0; 0; :::; 0; 1). These constructs then permit the de¯nition of the following subset of A (z 0 ):
Theorem 2 8W 2 W 1 ; 8z 1 2 P (z 0 ) :
Proof. For some z 0 2 Z and some z 1 := (¹ 1 ; I 1 ) 2 P (z 0 ), given that ¹ 0 < ¹ 1 by construction, if I 0¸I1 then it is trivial to show that (17) more interesting subcase where I 0 < I 1 , and de¯ne
The pro¯les z 2 and z 3 corresponding to x 2 and x 3 are illustrated in Figure 2 .
and by the principle of transfers I ¤ (¹; z 0 ) = I (x 2 )¸I 1¸I (x 3 ) = I 0 . By continuity there must be some ® 2 [0; 1] such that
in which case it is immediate from (20) that (17) holds.
Notice that, by construction, P (z 0 ) is the largest set of pro¯les which are regarded as W 1 -preferable to z 0 , and that it is bounded by the graph of I ¤ :
the set of points of the form ¹ P (z 0 ) := fz : z = (¹; I ¤ (¹; z 0 )) ; ¹¸¹ 0 g provides a boundary conditional on a particular distributional pro¯le z 0 . For the ADSI class we have
which, in the case of the subclass of extended Gini measures, reduces to
Notice that through each point (pro¯le) z 0 2 Z, there is a frontier ¹ P and a contour of the reduced-form social welfare function H (W ) . We may then state:
Theorem 3 For any inequality-averse monotonic SWF and any z 0 2 Z, when-
Figure 3: A violation of monotonicity ever the contour of H (W ) intersects ¹ P (z 0 ), it must do so from below.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that H (W ) intersects ¹ P (z 0 ) from above as in Figure 3 . 10 By construction H (W ) (z 0 ) = H (W ) (z 1 ), z 2 is W 1 -preferable to z 0 . and pro¯les z 1 ; z 2 have the same mean. If W is inequality-averse then
This theorem may then be used to give a more general interpretation to Theorem 1 which was obtained under the assumption of uniform di®erentiability:
10 The H (W ) -contour has been drawn with a kink at z 0 to illustrate the generality of the result. Of course it need not be kinked, nor piecewise linear, and it may be convex rather than concave.
Corollary 4 If W satis¯es monotonicity, the limit of the slope of I ¤ (¹; z 0 ) as ¹ # ¹ 0 must be less than the limit of the slope of the contour of
Substitution from (23) or from (24) will con¯rm the result for the general ADSI class and for the special case of the Gini index respectively. In the latter case we¯nd that the condition for monotonicity amounts to:
where the slope is to be interpreted in the manner of Corollary 4. This can be re- ¹ (Chipman 1974 , Dagum 1990 does not satisfy the condition and it is easy to see that this index violates monotonicity: Table 1 shows an example where distribution B has a higher mean income and higher inequality than A. B alsō rst-order dominates A. However the Chipman-Dagum social welfare function 11 A generalisation of this form is to be found in Lambert (1985) . See also Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994) Similar interpretations can be provided in terms of other members of the ADSI class (2).
Conclusions
The use of ad hoc inequality measures begs the question of whether the empirical judgements made using them will be in accordance with conventional welfare properties. The reduced-form SWF is the appropriate tool to clarify this issue.
The transfer principle is inherited automatically by the SWF from an inequality measure; now we have shown that the condition on the reduced-form SWF that ensures consistency with the monotonicity criterion is surprisingly simple. In the case of the Gini index this condition is particularly appealing, and does not rely on arbitrary assumptions of di®erentiability of the SWF.
Finally, a word of caution. Cardinalisations of inequality measures are sometimes viewed as irrelevant, but in the analysis of the so-called \equity-e±ciency trade-o®" this is not quite so. As the discussion of the elasticity of the H (W ) -contours makes clear, the results we have obtained are speci¯cally for the \natu-ral" cardinalisation of the index (2). A modi¯ed version of Theorem 1 and related results will be applicable under continuous monotonic transformations of I.
